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Abstract 
As part of its food security policy, South Korea has been pursuing food self-
sufficiency using high tariffs and high administrative prices in key agricultural and food 
markets. Using a dual approach to trade and trade restrictiveness indices, we analyze the 
impact of these market distortions on welfare and trade volume. Then, we compute 
optimum distortions, which minimize the welfare costs of observed self-sufficiency and 
production objectives. We rationalize these optimum distortions to what could be claimed 
as legitimate protection under a “food security” (FS) box in World Trade Organization 
negotiations. FS-box protection is sensitive to changes in the definition and the extent of 
the FS objectives. We show that FS via production targets and reliance on imports would 
be more palatable to consumers and trade partners while preserving rents to the farm sector. 
 
Key words: agricultural distortions, food security, Korea, protection, targeting, WTO 
negotiations.
  
 
 
 
FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
Introduction 
The Republic of Korea has supported its agricultural sector at a relatively high level 
compared to the policies of other member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Public intervention mainly consists of high 
production prices supported by government purchases, together with high tariffs that 
protect domestic producers from foreign competition and, implicitly, from tax consumers. 
Trade liberalization recently took place in certain sectors, and Korea is now a major 
importer of oilseeds and coarse grains. However, Korea only reluctantly exposed its 
agricultural sector to the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA) (IATRC 1997). It has kept very high tariffs in the rice, meat, and dairy sectors; 
high production subsidies in most other sectors; and significant non-tariff trade barriers 
on many commodities, including administrative barriers (import monopolies) and 
sanitary restrictions (IATRC 1994; Thornsbury et al.).  
Exporting countries have stressed that Korean farm policy imposes high food costs 
on consumers and increases the cost of labor for its manufacturing sector. By artificially 
maintaining resources in agriculture, Korean agricultural policy allegedly slows the 
growth rate of the entire domestic economy. Other World Trade Organization (WTO) 
member countries complain that Korea, while benefiting from global manufacturing 
export opportunities, imposes considerable obstacles to other countries’ exports of food 
products (Diao et al.).  
In current WTO negotiations, the Korean government promotes “non-trade 
concerns” in agriculture, such as food security (FS) objectives (WTO 2000b), and 
emphasizes the need for ensuring an adequate supply of food in all market conditions. 
Korea makes a strong case that Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) 
should be able to support the domestic production of staple crops and argues that such 
measures should be exempted from reduction commitments on the grounds of FS (WTO 
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2001b). This stance is consistent with developing countries’ proposals for “food security” 
and “development” boxes, which would legitimize larger support to domestic production 
and trade barriers. Recent debates under the auspices of the World Bank (2001) show a 
large coalition of sympathizers with Korea’s position on FS. Free trade, it is argued, is 
not a guarantee of reliable access to cheap food under all conditions.1 
Korea defines FS as a perplexing joint reliance on trade, domestic production, and 
self-sufficiency (WTO 2000a,b; 2001b). Despite some trade concessions under the 
URAA, Korea has nevertheless openly pursued food self-sufficiency as the desirable way 
to achieve FS. FS based on self-sufficiency is a recurrent theme among developing 
members of the WTO. For instance, India has proposed an “FS” box (WTO 2001a). 
However, self-sufficiency objectives are detrimental to (poor) consumers, and alternative 
policies, such as production subsidies, are a more targeted way to achieve FS objectives. 
Korea and India’s promotion of self-sufficiency, which penalizes consumers, looks 
inconsistent with their endorsement of FS as “access to food for all,” proposed during the 
World Food Summit of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Our paper contributes to the agricultural trade policy debate by providing a rigorous 
assessment of current agricultural policies in South Korea and, more generally, of FS 
strategies promoted by many developing economies. A first contribution of our paper is 
to estimate the welfare costs and trade implications of Korean agricultural policy, using a 
multimarket dual approach to trade based on Anderson and Neary 1996. We consider 
major policy instruments such as tariffs, price support, input subsidies, and consumption 
taxes. A comparison of these costs since 1979 makes it possible to assess how the policy 
changes that took place in the 1990s translate into welfare. 
Second, Korea is part of a multilateral trading system that relies on the most-favored-
nation clause, implying some import volume expansion. We measure the degree of 
restriction, expressed in volume of trade that is generated by Korean agricultural policy, 
using the “mercantilist” indicator of trade restrictiveness (Anderson and Neary 2000). 
This index provides a metric of foregone trade opportunities by other WTO members.  
Finally, we estimate how Korea could rationalize its policy instruments for several FS 
objectives. We begin with self-sufficiency in staple crops and meat and present the structure 
of optimal consumption taxes and production subsidies, together with their welfare and trade 
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impacts. We then look at FS attained under joint reliance on imports and production targets. 
We show the sensitivity of the level and nature of protection to the commodity coverage of 
the target through cross-price effects in production and consumption. We conclude the 
targeting section by drawing implications on strategic considerations for trade negotiations 
regarding support levels under the development or FS box.  
The policy recommendation punch line of our paper is that developing members of 
the WTO who endorse FS should advocate deficiency payments for their agricultural 
production and open their borders simultaneously. This would represent a tit-for-tat 
strategy with major players such as the United States. This strategy is much less 
antagonizing than self-sufficiency for trade partners and much more beneficial to 
consumers and small producers who are net buyers of food. Policy rents to farmers would 
be little affected. 
 
The Analytical Framework 
We use a multimarket model of Korean agriculture and food markets embedded in a 
dual approach to trade to estimate the supply and demand response to government 
intervention and the subsequent welfare effects. Following Anderson and Neary (1996 
and 2000), these distorted markets are treated as being separable from the rest of the 
economy. The set of policy instruments that is considered here affects the output prices, 
consumption prices, and input prices. Tariffs and government purchases translate into 
producer and consumer prices higher than the border price. Input subsidies and direct 
payments are modeled by lower input prices that are commodity-specific in the case of 
fertilizer taxes, irrigation subsidies, and subsidized interest rates. Consumption subsidies 
are modeled by lower consumer prices. We cover rice, wheat, barley, corn, soybean milk, 
beef, pork, and poultry. Details on the policy instruments and information on the data are 
provided in Appendix A. 
Demand for food is represented by an incomplete Linquad demand system calibrated 
to existing estimates of income and price elasticities for agricultural and food products 
(LaFrance; Lafrance et al.). The sub-demand system for agricultural and food products is 
constructed assuming that other consumption goods are a composite single good. 
Homogeneity in prices of the complete system is accounted for by expressing all prices 
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relative to the price index of the composite non-agricultural good.2 Let x be an n-vector of 
agricultural goods on demand, q be an n-vector of corresponding consumptions prices, 
and qz be the consumption price of non-agricultural goods z. Variable y is an m-vector of 
agricultural netputs, including n (positive) agricultural outputs and m–n (negative) inputs, 
and p is the corresponding price m-vector. Variable M is total income or expenditure; p* 
denotes the m-vector or world prices for agricultural inputs and outputs. The Linquad 
expression of the vector of Marshallian demands for agricultural and food goods is  
 
1
2( ( ))M zx Vq M q q Vq qε χ ε δ′ ′= + + − − − , (1) 
corresponding to the expenditure function 
 
1
2( , , ) ( ) ( , ) exp( )z z ze q q u q q Vq q q u pε δ θ χ′ ′ ′= − − + . (2) 
The elements of the n-vectors ε  and χ  in equation (1), together with the elements of the 
n×n matrix V, are calibrated using the procedure described in Appendix B. The 
calibration imposes homogeneity of degree one in prices for e and symmetry of the 
Hessian of e. Concavity is verified locally.  
The whole production sector of the economy is represented by a gross domestic 
product (GDP) function ( , , )zgdp p p φ , with zp  denoting the price of non-agricultural 
netputs, and φ  denoting a vector of fixed endowments and the technology. We assume that 
gdp is separable into the agricultural and non-agricultural components, g, so that  
 
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ),z f z fgdp p p p y g p yφ −= Π +
 
(3) 
where yf	
 
quadratic revenue function 
 
( , ) ( ),f fp y p p Wp h yη ′Π = + +  (4) 
leading to supply functions being linear in relative prices. As for the demand system, the 
price responses of agricultural supply and demand for inputs are calibrated using prior 
information on price elasticities. Homogeneity of degree zero in netput price and 
symmetry are imposed at the sectoral level, and convexity is verified locally. This 
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multimarket model is then imbedded in a dual approach to trade, namely, the Balance of 
Trade (BoT) function. 
The BoT function, B, is defined as the sum of the value of a consumer’s excess 
demand over income at external prices. It is built up from the consumer’s expenditure 
function and the revenue (GDP) function, net of the government tax revenue function, or  
* *( ) ( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]z z f z z fB p, p ,q,q  u, , y ,  = e q,q , u - gdp p, p , - q - p ´x q, u  - p - p ´y p, y  + ,φ β φ β
 
(5) 
where β is the sum of the tariff revenue on non-agricultural goods and the net financial 
transfers from abroad, both of which are assumed constant in the rest of the paper. We 
assume perfect competition and exogenous world prices. Derivative properties applied to 
e and gdp yield compensated consumption and output quantities and their difference 
yields imported quantities. 
The BoT function B includes a general equilibrium concept. Expenditure and 
revenue functions characterize the private sector structure of supply and demand of the 
distorted sectors analyzed in the economy. However, because of the tax revenue raised by 
distortions, both government and private behavior are summarized by B(p,q,p*,u,γ), 
where γ represents the constant elements ( , , , , )z z fp q yφ β . The BoT function represents 
the external budget constraint and is equal to the net transfer required to reach a given 
level of aggregate domestic welfare, u, for a given set of domestic prices. Net 
government revenue from agricultural and food distortions is equal to [(q–p*)´x(q,u)–(p–
p*)´ y(p)], where the fixed endowments are ignored to simplify notation. Consumption 
subsidies are captured by (q–p) negative, the cost of tariffs and taxes to consumers by (q–
p*), and the producer prices, including support and subsidies, by (p–p*). 
Subtracting the partial derivatives of the BoT function with respect to domestic 
prices (p, q) yields Bp∇−  and Bq∇− , the vectors of marginal welfare costs of domestic 
price distortions in production and in consumption, respectively. As dp and dq represent 
the producer and consumer price distortions, the total deadweight loss from these 
distortions is equal to minus the change in the foreign exchange to support u, or minus 
( )p qBdp Bdq∇ +∇ . This is the additional foreign exchange required to compensate for a 
change in distorted prices (dp, dq) in order to maintain the initial welfare level. Variables  
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TABLE 1. Support in Korean agriculture  
 Period (3-Year Average) 
 1979-81 1990-92 1998-2000 
GDP, 109 wons at 1995 prices 118,302 284,851 435,779 
Share of agriculture in GDPa 13.1% 6.7% 4.2% 
% PSE (OECD) 56% 77% 65% 
% CSE (OECD) 56% 72% 63% 
Consumption at domestic price/ 
consumption at world pricesb 2.23 3.21 2.27 
Production at domestic price/ production at 
world pricesb 2.35 4.04 3.05 
a Commodities covered by OECD’s PSEs only.  
bLaspeyres index, fixed production and consumption weights.  
 
 
Bp∇  and Bq∇ can be derived from totally differentiating B, and they can be 
parameterized and estimated using the calibrated food demand and supply responses. 
 
Welfare Costs of Korean Agricultural Policy 
As shown in Table 1, the producer support estimate (PSE), measured by the OECD 
and expressed as a percentage of the value of production, reaches 74 percent in Korea 
compared to an OECD average of 40 percent in 1999. The Korean government provides a 
few direct payments and some input subsidies (fertilizers and interest subsidies). The 
main policy instruments are transfers from consumers, which account for 95 percent of 
the support to farmers (OECD 2001). Many consider such forms of public intervention 
most distortionary and believe that they impose welfare costs on the society as a whole.  
The welfare effect of the various policy instruments can be derived from the BoT 
function by constructing the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), which is a welfare-based 
single tariff equivalent of the various policy instruments (Anderson and Neary 1996). The 
TRI is the uniform scaling factor (or uniform price deflator ∆ ) that, when applied to 
period 1 prices, permits the representative consumer to attain his or her initial level of 
utility u0 while holding the BoT constant at its original (period 0) level bo: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 10 0 0, , , : / , / , ,p q u z B p q u z b ∆ ≡ ∆ ∆ ∆ =  . (6) 
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The scalar ∆  is the uniform deflator, which, if applied to all imported goods prices, 
would ensure a constant balance of payments at the initial level of utility. Consider the 
case where the comparison is between a protected situation 0 and free trade (i.e., p1 = q1 
= p* or 01 =τ , with the equality *(1 )i ip pτ= +  defining the ad valorem uniform tariff 
10,i,i =τ ). Then we have the equivalence between deflator (1/ 
 0): 
 
( ) ( )zupBbzupB ,,)1(,,/ 0*000* τ+==∆ . (7) 
The uniform tariff equivalent, ),1/1(0 −∆=τ  leads to period 0 welfare when applied to 
the set of world prices.3  In our case, specific production and consumption price 
distortions exist, and the TRI methodology applies to any subset of price distortions in 
any sector of the economy. In the rest of the paper, ∆  is referred to as the uniform 
deflator and 0 (1/ 1)τ = ∆ − , as the uniform unit price distortion. In the general case, 
without a general equilibrium model, the changes in ∆ have to be locally approximated. 
Total differentiation of B in equation (6) yields the percentage change in ∆  as a local 
approximation of the change in welfare BdqBdp qp ∇+∇  normalized by the 
factor BqBp qp ∇+∇ , or  
 
BqBp
BdqBdp
qp
qp
∇+∇
∇+∇
=∆ , (8) 
where the derivatives of B are evaluated by 1 1 0( / , / , )p q u∆ ∆ . That is, the change in the 
TRI deflator is a weighted average of the proportional changes in domestic prices. The 
weights are the shares of marginal deadweight loss due to each policy-induced price 
variation. The numerator of equation (3) measures the deadweight loss of the distortion 
changes and corresponds to the change in compensation measures (EV or CV) induced by 
dp and dq, or the change in the money metric utility for the same dp, dq up to 
normalization by the shadow price of foreign exchange (Anderson and Martin). Table 2 
provides the deadweight loss of the agricultural policy based on estimates of the 
components of Bp∇ and Bq∇ . When comparing the observed (distorted) situation 0 and 
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the situation 1 without public intervention (at the vector p* of free trade prices without input 
and consumption subsidies), it is possible to calculate the different components of the 
numerator of equation (8). The figures shown in Table 2 are in billion won at 1995 prices. 
The results provided in Table 2 show how costly the social transfers induced by 
Korean agricultural policy are in terms of welfare. The deadweight loss associated to the 
transfer of 10 wons to farmers amounts to roughly 5.8 wons. This is mainly caused by the 
particular policy instruments fully coupled to production and taxing consumers. High 
tariffs and administrative prices reflect the Korean preference for self-sufficiency 
objectives, regardless of the cost for consumers in sectors such as rice, pork, or poultry. 
Table 3 provides a measure of the TRI uniform distortion equivalent relative to free trade. 
Equation (8) leads to the proportional change in the uniform tariff. When comparing the 
observed (distorted) situation 0 and the situation without public intervention, equation (9) 
provides an approximation of 0 0/(1 )τ τ+ : 
 
0
0
0
0
11 τ
τ
τ
τ
+
=
+
−=
∆
∆
=∆
dd
. (9) 
 0 would lead to the present welfare if the reference prices were increased by 
this amount (i.e., if all the components of p*, the vector of netput prices in the free trade 
situation without intervention, were increased by a factor *p0τ ). Expression 
0000 qB/)qp(B ’q*’q ∇−∇  is the weighted sum of the unit distortion of consumption 
prices; the weights are the deadweight loss associated with the unit distortion on a 
 
 
TABLE 2. Transfers and welfare losses induced by Korean agricultural policies 
(all figures in billion 1995 wons) 
 Period (3-Year Average) 
 1979-81 1990-92 1998-2000 
Cumulative 
1979-2000 
Increase in agricultural revenue 6,640 10,982 10,571 218,595 
Tariff and tax revenues 1,762 1,532 1,228 26,258 
Deadweight loss consumption 1,557 3,015 2,430 49,976 
Deadweight loss production 1,553 3,650 3,722 69,277 
Deadweight loss total 3,111 6,665 6,152 119,254 
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TABLE 3. Trade Restrictiveness Index and related indicators 
 Period (3-Year Average) 
 1979-81 1990-92 1998-2000 
(1) d   0.58 0.74 0.67 
(2) Uniform unit distortion 1.39 2.87 2.15 
(3) Marginal welfare-weighted percentage 
distortion on consumption prices 
0.59 0.73 0.67 
(4) Consumption-weighted distortion on 
consumer prices (% actual value) 
0.55 0.69 0.54 
(5) Marginal welfare-weighted percentage 
distortion on output prices 
0.58 0.75 0.67 
(6) Production-weighted distortion on output 
prices 
0.58 0.75 0.66 
 
 
particular good. The comparison of this indicator (row 3 in Table 3) with the sum of each 
consumption distortion weighted by the consumption of each good n (row 4) shows that 
the use of the marginal deadweight loss on consumption as a weight results in a larger 
overall index. In a similar way, the deadweight loss weighted average of the production 
distortions 0000 pB/)pp(B ’p*’p ∇−∇  (row 5 of Table 3) is larger than the average 
distortion weighted by the share in production (row 6). 
 
The Effect of Korean Agricultural Policy on Each Agricultural Sector 
The relative impact of the various policies can be seen by simulating the effect of the 
whole set of taxes and subsidies on a particular commodity. This requires taking into 
account the specific measures for each input, such as irrigation subsidies, capital grants, 
subsidies for fertilizer use, etc. These inputs were allocated to each production using 
annual input/output coefficients (see Appendix A), and a reference price was constructed 
for each commodity-specific input by allocating a detailed set of subsidies to the various 
agricultural productions based on the allocation used by the OECD for the calculation of 
the PSEs. 
The deadweight loss in consumption corresponding to the commodity i is estimated 
by the expression ’ 0 * 0( )q iB p q∇ − , where the elements of pi* are the reference price in the 
case of the commodity i and the commodity-specific input and are the observed prices qo 
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in other cases. A similar computation is made for estimating the deadweight loss on the 
production side. The sum of the two components provide the total welfare effect 
associated with the government intervention on commodity i, which includes the market 
price support, the output enhancing subsidies, and the subsidies to the input used in the 
production of i (Table 4, row 5). The contribution of the commodity-specific policy to the 
overall welfare is expressed as a percentage (Table 4, row 6). 
The effect of the policy on the revenue of agricultural producers can be derived 
from the sectoral GDP function. The derivatives of Π relative to distorted prices Π∇ p  
give the amount of income resulting from an increase in output (decrease in input) 
prices. Because of Hotelling’s lemma, these are the elements of the production vector. 
 
 
TABLE 4. Commodity-specific effect of Korean agricultural policy (figures in billion 
1995 wons; all figures are average 1998-2000) 
 Rice Wheat Barley Corn Soybean Milk Beef Pork Poultry Overall 
Value of output at 
domestic prices 
8,474 6 189 - 251 1,050 1,883 1,966 619 14,438 
Value of output at 
reference prices 
1,957 5 41 - 35 328 739 1,332 503 4,940 
Consumption at 
domestic prices 
8,140 631 215 1,593 665 1,215 3,132 2,009 693 18,293 
Consumption at 
reference prices 
1,935 629 73 1,585 444 388 1,197 1,385 575 8,211 
Product-related 
deadweight loss 
(consumption; 
production) 
3,569 
(948) 
(2,680) 
-0.3 
(-0.3) 
(-) 
59 
(57) 
(-) 
0 
(0) 
(-) 
80 
(26) 
(55) 
726 
(325) 
(401) 
1,442 
(927) 
(516) 
466 
(144) 
(322) 
147 
(3) 
(144) 
6152 
(2,430) 
(3,722) 
Contribution to total 
welfare costs 
55% 0% 1% 0% 1% 11% 22% 7% 2% - 
Income transfers to 
producersa 
7,151 0 161 - 229 793 1,269 793 173 10,571 
Transfer efficiencyb 67% - 73% - 74% 52% 47% 63% 54% 63% 
Direct welfare effect 2,708 0 100 0 81 586 1,348 378 44 - 
Cross-commodity 
welfare effect 
-27 -0.2 -48 0 -16 2 -96 -98 -21 - 
Input welfare effect 888 - 7 - 15 138 190 193 124 - 
aIncludes input subsidies.  
bDefined as transfers/(transfers+deadweight loss). 
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That is, the income effect of the agricultural policy is approximated by 
’ *( )p p p∇ Π − . A similar approach is used for estimating the revenue effect of the 
agricultural policy on a commodity-specific basis. 
The efficiency of the agricultural policy, defined as the overall cost to the society of 
transferring income to producers, can be estimated by the deadweight loss (on both the 
consumption and production sides) associated with one unit of the extra producer income 
resulting from the policy. It therefore is defined as one plus the ratio of the revenue effect 
dp’pΠ∇  to the welfare effect BdqBdp qp ∇+∇  and is provided in Table 4, row 6. Rice 
growers get the largest transfer, followed by beef, pork, and milk producers. Rice policy 
has the highest contribution to foregone welfare, followed by beef, dairy, and pork. Beef 
has the lowest efficiency of transfer, at around 47 percent. The effect of government 
intervention on a particular product has implications in terms of substitution on both the 
production and consumption of other products when prices are influenced. The 
deadweight loss generated by a commodity-specific policy can be decomposed in terms 
of an own-price effect, a cross-price effect, and an input effect that measure the impact of 
the public policy (both on output and input through prices subsidies) on input use. Input 
distortions have the largest amounts of welfare losses in the rice and pork sectors, where 
they account for one-fourth and one-third of the deadweight losses in these respective 
sectors. However, deadweight loss levels induced by input subsidies are nearly negligible 
in all other sectors, except for beef, dairy, and poultry. 
 
Trade Impacts of Korean Agricultural Policy and Mercantilism 
As a member of the WTO, Korea had to convert quantitative restrictions on imports 
into bound tariffs, reduce these tariffs over an implementation period, open its market to 
imports under the minimum access provisions, and reduce the most trade-distorting forms 
of domestic support in 1994. However, Korea applied the Uruguay Round provisions so 
that it could protect its producers from foreign competition in key sectors (IATRC 1997). 
For example, Korea postponed the tariffication of rice for 10 years and negotiated an 
obligation to import only 4 percent of its consumption by 2004. In most of the staple 
foods, Korea has also kept import restrictions under domestic special rules. Prohibitive 
tariffs and administrative barriers still restrict imports of many agricultural goods to 
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Korea (IATRC 1994). Self-sufficiency remains a policy objective (see Table 5), 
particularly in the rice sector, because of the cultural content of this good and because of 
the possible reunification with North Korea, which has been experiencing dramatic 
shortages of rice, making this issue particularly sensitive. 
From the point of view of the other countries involved in the trade negotiations, the 
variable of interest is the volume of imports and exports of the given country, rather than 
its welfare. This motivates an evaluation of the restrictiveness of trade policy using trade 
volume as the reference standard rather than the utility of the representative consumer 
(Salvatici, Carter, and Sumner). Anderson and Neary (2000) have proposed the 
mercantilistic trade restrictiveness index (MTRI), which relies on the idea of finding a 
uniform tariff that yields the same trade volume as the original tariff structure. The 
definition of the MTRI shares the basic BoT framework of the TRI. It provides a metric 
of foregone trading opportunities induced by a set of distortions, while holding constant 
the BoT function but not utility. 
Define mc as a vector of Hicksian import demand functions. This is the vector 
derived from the expenditure and revenue function: 
 
( , , ) ( , ) ( ),c q pm p q u e q u p= ∇ −∇ Π  (10) 
where the set of variables γ  is innocuously omitted. The general-equilibrium Marshallian 
import demand function depends on domestic and world prices and on exogenous income 
 
TABLE 5. Self-sufficiency in Korean agriculture 
 Rice Wheat Barley Corn Soybean Milk Beef Pork Poultry 
Production (103 
tons) 1998-2000 
5,217 4 271 0 128  2,186 327 911 346 
Consumption (103 
tons) 1998-2000 
5,148 3,113 469 9,438 1,667  2,595 547 959 401 
Net imports in % 
consumption 
1979-81 
19% 97% 21% 100% 66%  -0.1% 19% 14% -0% 
Net imports in % 
consumption 
1990-92 
0% 99% 15% 100% 85%  6% 53% -0% 9% 
Net imports in % 
consumption 
1998-2000 
-1% 99% 42% 100% 92%  16% 40% 5% 14% 
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b for the entire economy, m(p,p*,b). Anderson and Neary (2000) relate the Hicksian 
import demand function to the GE Marshallian one, as both coincide when the balance-
of-payments equilibrium holds: in other words, when the BoT equates the lump sum 
transfer from abroad b, i.e., B(p,q,p*,u)=b. This makes it possible to define the equivalent 
of a Slutsky identity for the import demand function and to relate both import demand 
functions, i.e., 
 
* ’( , , , ) c c cu b
du
m p q p b m m m m B
dπ π π ππ
∇ = ∇ +∇ = ∇ −∇ ∇ , (11) 
where π is used as a synthetic notation for either p or q vectors. The scalar import volume 
function, M, corresponding to the Marshallian import demand M(p,q,p*,b) in equation 
(12) gives the volume of imports at world prices when domestic prices equal (p,q) and the 
trade balance equals b:  
 
* * *( , , , ) . ( , , , )M p q p b p m p q p b= . (12) 
We use equation (11) and 1* * *1 ( ) ( , ) ( , )M Mb b I IM p m q p x q I p x q I
− ∇ = ∇ = − − ∇ ∇  , 
where xM denotes the Marshallian consumer demand, to retrieve the price derivatives of 
the Marshallian import demand function Mπ∇  as shown in equation (13):  
 
* *c
bM p m p m Bπ π π∇ = ∇ − ∇ ∇ . (13) 
Note that Mb∇ is the marginal propensity to consume tariff-constrained imports; 
* 1[1 ( ) ( , )]MIq p x q I −− − ∇ is the shadow price of foreign exchange and MI x∇ is the 
marginal income response vector for the n consumption goods (Anderson and Neary 
2000).4 The Marshallian MTRI is the most relevant index for measuring the overall trade 
impact of distortions. The MTRI gives the uniform price deflator µ  which, when applied 
to the prices in the new equilibrium situation 1 yields the same volume (at world prices) 
of tariff-restricted imports as in the initial situation 0:  
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 ( ) ( ){ }1 1 0 1 1 * 0 0 0 *0 0( , , ) , ,                 µ µ≡ = = . (14) 
 As was the case with the TRI, if p1 equals its free trade values p*, the scalar (1/µ–1) 
is the uniform tariff, which is equivalent in import volume to the initial tariff-distorted 
trade structure.5 The effect of tariff changes in the MTRI can be approximated by using 
price derivatives of the Marshallian import demand function Mπ∇ , evaluated at 
(p1/µ, p1/µ): 
 
’ ’
. .
. .
p q
p q
M dp M dqd
M p M q
µµ
µ
∇ +∇
= ≈ −
∇ +∇
 . (15) 
 Using the vector of prices in the absence of distortion as the reference situation 1, 
and the observed prices as situation 0, the MTRI change is estimated using the expression 
of the demand system (2) and the sectoral GDP function (3) to retrieve the derivatives of 
the import demand functions (13). Table 6 provides the results. The change in the MTRI 
in equation (15) is a weighted sum of the proportional changes in consumption and 
production prices between the observed situation and the situation in the absence of 
public intervention. The weights are the marginal volumetric shares of each price change.  
  
 
TABLE 6. Trade volume restrictiveness of Korean agricultural policy 
 Period (3-Year Average) 
 1979-81 1990-92 1998-2000 
Volume of trade restriction (billion 1995 wons) 2,138 2,120 2,273 
   0.50 0.51 0.39 
Uniform tariff τ 1.03 1.07 0.66 
Trade-weighted percentage distortion on 
consumption prices a -0.44 -0.45 -0.27 
Marginal trade-weighted distortion on consumption 
prices -0.47 -0.47 -0.33 
Trade-weighted percentage distortion on production 
prices a -0.44 -0.57 -0.45 
Marginal trade-weighted distortion on production 
prices -0.55 -0.58 -0.49 
aThe unit distortion is measured as (qn*-qn)/qn. for consumption prices and as (pn*-pn)/pn for production prices. 
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The uniform tariff equivalent has decreased dramatically during the 1990s. Recall 
that this is the tariff that should be applied to all goods under consideration (i.e., the list 
of the agricultural goods covered by the OECD PSEs) as this would give the actual level 
of imports in these goods. The decline by one-third of this indicator between 1990-92 and 
1998-2000 is mainly a result of the surge in imports of corn, wheat, and soybeans at 
relatively low tariffs and an increase in the imports of beef (see Table 5). 
 Table 6 shows that weighting individual tariffs (or, more exactly, their impact on both 
production and consumption prices) by the marginal trade impacts, as expressed by the 
MTRI, leads to slightly higher measures of trade restrictiveness than those found using 
standard import-weighted average distortion. 
 
Agricultural Policy in a Second-Best Framework 
The special session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture was established for the 
purpose of agricultural trade negotiations during the years 2000 and 2001. Proposals 
made during the session show that many developing and food-importing countries share 
Korea’s concerns about food dependency and possible price hikes, leading to 
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports.6 Most of them are also 
unsatisfied by the practical effect of the 1994 “Decision on Measures Concerning the 
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed Countries and 
NFIDCs” that accompanied the URAA. The “Decision” was supposed to address their 
concerns about FS.7 
We have shown in the two previous sections that Korean food policy has costly 
welfare effects that may frustrate mercantilist aspirations of trade partners by restricting 
agricultural trade. In this section, we take FS as a premise and investigate optimum 
distortion structures for several definitions of FS, including self-sufficiency. 
Tax Structure for Self-Sufficiency Targets 
First, consider Korea’s negotiating claim that WTO commitments should allow it to 
pursue desired FS and rural development policies, by setting an objective of a given 
degree of self-sufficiency in the grain sector, in the meat sector, and for a set of 
commodities that Korea actually produces (meat, grains, dairy). Within a second-best 
framework, it is possible to provide optimization of the tax structure for achieving a 
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given level of self-sufficiency α=(α1, α2,..,αn) for αnxn=yn, with the subscript referring to 
commodity n and with 0  n  1 for all n. From the targeting principle in a small 
economy (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan; Vousden), the optimum distortion 
structure calls for a production subsidy and a consumption tax that is equal to α, the 
production subsidy. In addition, input subsidies are inferior to output subsidies and 
should not be used; that is, marginal rates of technical substitution should be left 
undistorted (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan). 
Formally, consider the (specific) tax on consumption *cn n nq pτ = −  and the tax on 
production *pn n np pτ = −  for good n. Efficiency costs should be minimized under the 
constraint of the distortion structure satisfying the self-sufficiency target. Imports 
represent a predefined proportion of demand at the distorted prices: 
 
* *( , ) (  ) 0c pn n n nx p u y pα τ τ+ − + = . (16) 
Differentiating equation (16) and the BoT function leads to the following system of 
equations: 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2
(1
M
c p cn
n n n n n
n n
n n n n
n n n n
x e g edu dp dq
I u p q
e e gdu dq dp
q u q q p
τ τ τ
α α
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− = − + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ + = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
. (17) 
Rearranging leads to the expression of du, in terms of dq and the first-order condition: 
 0 0c pn n n
n
du
dq
τ τ α= ⇒ − = . (18) 
That is, a necessary condition for the second-best tax structure is that the relative 
consumption and production taxes verify pnn
c
n τατ =  for all n. To solve for the optimum 
  	!	-sufficiency target i at 
non-distorted prices, based on equation (16): Ai(p ,u) = α ix i(p*,u) – yi(p*)⇒α idxi  – 
dyi  = –Ai . This excess demand’s response to optimum distortions is  
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H
i i i
i jp
j j j
A x y
p p
α α
τ
∂ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
for targeted self-sufficiency levels αi  , and αj for i and j. The optimum distortion reduces 
the excess demand (over the target) and minimizes welfare losses relative to a free trade 
situation, as expressed by the following equations:
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i
i
K
j
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j
ip
j Adu
u
e
I
xA
−=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂∑ αττ   (19) 
for K self-sufficiency targets at level αj with i and j=1,…,K, and 
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, (20) 
to be minimized. The latter expression comes from the differentiation of the BoT 
function. Minimizing welfare losses (19) subject to (20) yields the optimum τ structure. 
In a first set of simulations, we define the optimal tax structure under the constraint 
of achieving the historical level of self-sufficiency over the 1998-2000 period. 
Simulations were conducted in two ways: imposing the observed levels of self-
sufficiency for the whole set of commodities, and on a commodity-per-commodity basis. 
Table 7 shows that the present structure of taxes and subsidies is close to the one 
recommended for maximizing welfare under the constraint of the existing rate of self-
sufficiency. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 7 show that the ratio of the actual tax on consumption 
and subsidy of production is close to satisfying condition c cn n nτ α τ= . This is particularly 
the case for soybeans, a commodity whose production is supported at very high levels but 
for which consumers face relatively few taxes. This suggests that, if one focuses on a 
self-sufficiency objective, relatively little can be gained from a reform of the tax structure 
under these constraints, except for the input subsidies distorting marginal rates of 
substitution in production. The gains from such a minor tax reform would be limited to 
1,540 billion wons at 1995 prices.  
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Table 7. Targeting historical levels of self-sufficiency (all figures are 1998-2000 
averages) 
 Rice Wheat Barley Corn Soybean Dairy Beef Pork Poultry 
Actual production 
support (ad 
valorem 
equivalent) 
360% - 377% - 688% 222% 172% 52% 26% 
Actual consumption 
tax 
352% 0% 215% 1% 54% 215% 167% 48% 23% 
Ratio production/ 
consumption tax 
0.96 - 0.55 - 0.08 0.96 0.94 0.83 1 
Historical rate of 
self-sufficiency 
1.02a 0 0.58 0 0.08 0.85 0.60 0.95 0.87 
Second-best tax on 
production 
342% 0 366% 0 696% 238% 233% 51% 25% 
Second-best tax on 
consumption 
342% 0 214%  52% 200% 129% 47% 20% 
aWe constrain α=1 for rice. 
 
Self-sufficiency targets mean restricting demand by imposing high prices to 
consumers, which can lead to the absurd situation where a country insulates itself from 
the vicissitudes of world markets by starving its consumers. Consider the hypothetical 
case in which Korea would decide to become self-sufficient in proteins. In spite of a very 
high level of subsidies (equivalent to paying producers more than six times the world 
prices), Korean production of soybeans covers less than 10 percent of actual 
consumption. Simulations with the above model show that any self-sufficiency target 
could be achieved only by a choking contraction of demand, where very high 
consumption taxes would restrict the use of soybeans to a level that would be close to 
actual production. In Korea, self-sufficiency in pork and poultry production is achieved 
only by importing large quantities of soybeans and corn, which is less absurd than 
producing the feed domestically, but still less effective than importing meat in a land-
scarce country. These commodities face a relatively low tariff, while tariffs on meat are 
prohibitive. On this basis, self-sufficiency can hardly be defended on national security 
grounds: corn is supplied mainly by a single country, and the world market for soybeans 
has experienced some shortages in the past. This suggests that Korean self-sufficiency 
objectives in these sectors merely reflect simple tariff escalation and effective protection 
of meat products.  
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Finally, although we do not address this point formally, self-sufficiency penalizes 
poor consumers the most because it imposes on them a large expenditure share for food; 
this policy hardly qualifies under the objective to “provide food access to all.”  
Tax Structure Supporting Production Targets for Food Security 
A reasonable alternative would be to set production levels as targets in staple foods 
and rely on imports for additional sourcing of food items. Low or no tariffs on the 
consumer side would result in a higher demand, and the self-sufficiency ratio would 
decrease dramatically. However, domestic production would be maintained and would 
represent some insurance against world market uncertainty. The effect of this policy on 
domestic supply “security” would be the same as that of self-sufficiency policy, without 
distorting consumption decisions. 
Setting the constraint of achieving historical production levels leads to fixed output 
subsidies but no consumption tax (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan; Vousden). The 
corresponding level of output subsidy on a subset of targeted commodities k=1,…K can 
be found by solving the program 1 *[ / ] ( ( ) ( ))p py p y p y pτ τ−= ∂ ∂ + − , where jy (p*	 ) is 
the level of production target for commodity j, and j and k describe the K commodities 
that are targeted by the FS objectives. The elements of  corresponding to non-targeted 
commodities are equal to zero. Matrix "y/
 is k×k. Simulations show that this objective 
leads to production subsidies comparable to the present situation, which is not surprising, 
given the limited production impact of Korean input subsidies.  
Table 8 makes this point vividly. It compares the deadweight loss (EV from free 
trade) in the actual situation (column 1). It also shows the trade implications of the 
alternative approaches to FS, which are full self-sufficiency (columns 2 to 4), historical 
levels of self-sufficiency as a target (columns 5 to 7), and historical production levels as a 
target, as resulting from a policy based on deficiency payments and no tariffs (columns 8 
to 10). The second row of Table 8 gives the value of imports of all commodities at world 
prices under the four situations. The third row provides an indicator of the trade 
restriction caused by the corresponding tax structure, as measured by the numerator of the 
MTRI.  Finally, row 4 provides the uniform MTRI tariff, i.e., the tariff that should be  
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Table 8. Welfare and market access under self-sufficiency and production targets, 
1998-2000 average (all figures in 106 won at 1995 prices, except those in percentages) 
  Full Self-Sufficiency 
Target (=1) on   
Subsets of Goods 
Historical Self-
Sufficiency Target on 
Subsets of Goods 
Production Target, 
Historical Levels 
 
(1) 
 
Actual 
Situation 
(2) 
Staple 
Grains 
only 
(3) 
 
Meat 
Only 
(4) 
Grains, 
Meat 
Milk 
(5) 
Staple 
Grains 
Only 
(6) 
 
Meat 
Only 
(7) 
Grains, 
Meat, 
Milk 
(8) 
Staple 
Grains 
Only 
(9) 
 
Meat 
Only 
(10) 
Grains, 
Meat, 
Milk 
Deadweight 
loss EV a 
6,152 2,725 4,001 9,730 2,540 1,444 4,614 1,716 475 2,506 
Value of 
imports world 
prices 
3,275 4,843 3,702 2,270 4,842 4,357 3,381 5,044 5,065 4,431 
Trade 
restriction 
impact 
2,272 694 1,835 3,310 690 1,164 2,164 515 485 1,132 
Uniform  
equivalent 
tariff 
66% 19% 56% 98% 19% 35% 63% 14% 14% 32% 
aRelative to absence of public intervention. 
 
imposed on all prices of tradable commodities in order to lead to the volume of trade at a 
world price that corresponds to a given tax structure. 
Besides the welfare aspects, setting production targets rather than self-sufficiency 
targets represents a more palatable situation for mercantilist partners within the WTO 
and should facilitate the negotiation of large deficiency payments. This policy, which 
has been used in the main U.S. programs for years, makes it possible to avoid the 
present deadweight losses on the consumption side. This generates extra Korean 
imports and a loss of limited tariff revenue that can no longer be redistributed to 
consumers. However, the decrease in food costs for consumers, as well as the increase 
in consumption, results in significant welfare gains, sufficient to pay for the farm 
program and more. Targeted deficiency payments in the staple grains sector (rice and 
barley) that achieve historical production levels, while removing tariffs on imports, 
would result in a significant welfare improvement (the deadweight loss would be 
reduced by 72 percent compared to the actual situation, to 1,716 billion wons at 1995 
prices). It would also result in a significant expansion of market opportunities. The 
MTRI uniform tariff equivalent, a synthetic indicator of these market opportunities, 
would fall from 66 percent to 14 percent, and the volume of trade foregone would fall 
from 2,272 billion wons to 515 billion at 1995 prices. 
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Conclusions 
Despite partial trade liberalization under the URAA, South Korea has been pursuing 
a policy of food self-sufficiency using trade restrictions and administrative prices in key 
agricultural and food markets, while following production targets with partial trade 
opening in lesser markets. These measures are part of a declared policy of food security, 
or FS. We analyzed the impact of these market distortions on welfare and trade volume 
and we computed optimum distortions, which minimize the welfare cost of observed self-
sufficiency and production objectives. We also computed optimum distortions for FS 
relying on domestic production and imports for all products. We rationalized these 
optimum distortions as what could be claimed as legitimate protection under an “FS” box 
in the new round of WTO negotiations.  
Because Korea uses policy instruments that involve large production distortions and 
impose high prices to consumers, we find that the present policies result in considerable 
welfare losses. The efficiency of transfers to producers is poor; each won transferred to 
farmers costs consumers and taxpayers roughly 1.6 trillion won, and the objectives of 
self-sufficiency are obtained through a significant contraction of demand and high prices 
that are unlikely to make food access easier for the less-favored consumers. 
Compared to optimal self-sufficiency policies, the observed system of taxes and 
subsidies is nearly optimal to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, similar objectives of 
FS could be achieved through production targets and open borders without the actual 
(considerable) welfare losses. While the administration of programs such as deficiency 
payments might be difficult in some developing countries, which lack administration 
capacities and a large taxpayer basis, it is unlikely to impose more of an administrative 
burden than the actual agricultural policy, characterized by a high degree of state 
intervention. 
There is growing pressure for consideration of an FS box in a future WTO agreement 
and a growing recognition from developed countries that some of the NFIDCs’ concerns 
in this area are legitimate. However, genuine concerns for FS should not be used as a 
justification for what is actually effective protection. From this point of view, the present 
Korean policy in the meat sector appears inconsistent. Most of the local production is 
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achieved thanks to large amounts of imported feedstuffs, and the Korean policy 
corresponds mainly to tariff escalation rather than to FS concerns. 
The setting of self-sufficiency targets appears to be dominated by other strategies 
when pursuing FS. Reliance on free trade with production targets is more rational and 
could provide the same level of protection to producers while reducing consumers’ 
welfare cost. We found that the welfare gains of such a policy are considerable, even 
when maintaining present levels of production. Such a reorientation of policy instruments 
also would increase demand and hence exports from mercantilist trade partners who find 
current Korean policy of nearly prohibitive agricultural tariffs unpalatable.  
To conclude, our policy recommendation is that developing members of the WTO 
who endorse FS should advocate deficiency payments for their agricultural production 
and open their borders. This tit-for-tat strategy, which mirrors U.S. policy, is much less 
antagonizing than self-sufficiency for trade partners and much more beneficial to 
consumers and small producers who are net buyers of food. Policy rents to farmers would 
be unaffected. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Several arguments have been made for this being the case. Food aid often decreases when world prices 
rocket and when aid is most needed. The European Union export tax set on grains in 1996, a poor 
harvest year, signaled that domestic consumers of exporting countries could matter more than NFIDCs 
consumers, in case of a grain shortage. Successive U.S. embargoes (for example, the 1973 soybean 
exports ban) and the versatility of the foreign policy of successive U.S. administrations are hardly 
perceived as a motive for trust by these countries.  
2. In the following notations, p, q, and pz express nominal prices deflated by the aggregate price index of 
non-agricultural goods. 
3. Note that in more general cases, where the comparison holds between two protected situations, the TRI 
is the uniform tariff surcharge equivalent that keeps period 0 welfare when applied to period 1 prices 
of imported goods. 
4. The MTRI could be defined from the Hicksian volume import demand, which would help isolate the 
roles of substitution and income effects. The MTRI constructed from the compensated import demand 
function does not capture the whole effect of the tariff structure on imports, because it keeps the utility 
constant. Hence, it ignores the redistribution of the tariff revenues and taxes to the aggregate consumer. 
5. In more general cases, the (1/µ−1) is the uniform tariff surcharge that when applied to the situation 1 
prices would lead to the same volume of trade at world prices as in situation 0. 
6. See, for example, the “Proposal by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador: Special and Differential Treatment and a 
Development Box,” G/AG/NG/W/13 (WTO 2000c). See also the proposals by India in the area of FS 
in G/AG/NG/W/102 (WTO 2001a), and the statement by Brazil, G/AG/NG/W/62 (WTO 2000d).  
7. The “Decision” was a response to the fears of many low-income countries that trade liberalization 
would open their domestic food markets to volatile world prices and would threaten to undermine their 
FS. The Decision mentions four specific responses to this difficulty: food aid, favorable treatment with 
export credits, concessional financing for food imports, and technical and financial assistance to 
increase agricultural productivity and production. Matthews (2001) shows that in practice, the Decision 
did not address the main concerns of these countries. Makki et al. provide an interesting analysis of 
buffer stock and trade as a strategy to hedge price volatility. 
 
  
Appendix A 
Data 
 The analysis is based on the commodities covered by the OECD PSE database, including rice, wheat, 
barley, corn, soybean milk, beef, pork, and poultry. This covers 62 percent of the value of Korean 
agricultural production in 1979 and 56 percent in 2000. Fruits and vegetables are not included. Sugar and 
sheep meat are not considered here because of the low degree of government intervention. Wheat and corn 
are considered only on the consumption side because of the very low level of production over the period. 
 Output prices p and quantities y, consumption prices q and quantities xi, and reference prices p* (i.e., 
international prices at the border or other non-distorted prices) are obtained from the PSEs and CSEs of the 
OECD dataset. In the case of dairy products, as there is no trade in fluid product, the convention adopted by 
the OECD is to use the producer price in a reference country where there is no public support (e.g., New 
Zealand is used as a reference and to adjust for transportation costs, differences in fat content, and to 
calculate a market price support; see OECD 2001). In the case of pork, the reference price is constructed on 
the basis of the Japanese wholesale price. Unpublished OECD data made it possible to allocate the various 
subsidies and to include them either as input price reduction or as output price supplement. The prices of 
input in the distorted situation are set to one and the non-reference input price is calculated using the 
(commodity-specific) input cost reduction. The allocation of input quantities to each product relies on the 
1995 input-output table of the Bank of Korea. All prices are converted into 1995 prices deflated by the 
producer price index for agricultural, forestry, and fishery products and the consumer price index for food 
products.  
 The Linquad system parameters and the supply response system parameters are calibrated using the 
elasticities of the SWOPSIM (Static World Policy Simulation) database of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and data from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, Namdoo (1996), Chul-
Hyun (1997), and from background (unpublished) documents of the OECD (1998). The price responses of 
inputs are recovered using economic properties such as homogeneity condition and symmetry condition.  
  
Appendix B 
Calibration for the Linquad Demand System 
 Parameters of equation (1) are identified by solving the following system of equations: 
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where the derivatives 

 are estimated thanks to prior information on local elasticities at the reference 
point, denoted by a bar above the variables. The calibration is sequential. First, the elements of χ, i.e., the 
slope of income response of consumption of agricultural goods, are calibrated using estimates of the 
income demand elasticities (see Appendix A). Then the estimated χ is used in the system of equations 
shown above, which is linear in unknown parameters ε and ν. Elements 
 ik are set equal to zero for cross-
price responses 
i/
k, for which no prior information is known. The system is exactly identified. 
Calibration makes it possible to express the functional form of the Marshallian demand system (1), and to 
retrieve the right-hand side of the derivatives shown above. The expression Hx p V∂ ∂ = +
 
1
2
( )M q q Vqχ ε χ′ ′ ′− −  for the Linquad Hicksian price response, is derived from the Slutsky identity with 
the calibrated values of the elements of V and e, that is, in a vector form. This expression makes it possible 
to infer demand under different price systems. 
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